Trump says he bombed Iran

[RazorV66]

Isn't it odd that the U.S. bombers were allowed to do whatever they wanted to do there without Iran sending in their air force, hmm?

It took the U.S. bombers less than a half hour to bomb the three sites, tell me they didn't know they were entering their air space, how they didn't scramble to their fighter jets, how it would have taken them a long time to get it together, they couldn't follow them out of their air space, because why?... tell me how it went down.

No it's not odd, it's because those sites were of no value any more, so bomb away.

A Closer Look At Iranian Air Force Capabilities

A Timeline of the U.S. Attack in Iran - The New York Times

Isreal took out 90% or more of their air defense network and many air force assets on the ground.

Their capabilities are practically nonexistent plus they would have been no match for the fighter escorts that were accompanying the B-2s.
They didn’t launch any because even if they did detect the incoming strike force, there was basically nothing to launch to attempt to defend anything. 

Just stop and stay in your lane.

[sahgwa]

I can easily rationalize this occurring...



[Image: https://denyignorance.com/uploader/image...04-348.jpg]

BINGO
Strikes were known about. planned and even agreed upon by elements in Iran
Damage if largely done was mostly underground where we cant see
Furthermore Iran moved most of their material out beforehand.

[Mantiss2021]

Iran's parliament has approved legislation to withdraw Iran from the IAEA nuclear "watch dog".

I cannot help but read this as "No bueno".  The sense I get being that Iran has decided to pursue activities which would come under scrutiny, and sanction, by the IAEA; chief among such activities likely being the development, and/or manufacturing of nuclear weapons.

A curious move on Iran's part if, in fact, their nuclear programs/assets/stockpile have been "obliterated", or even "severely damaged or destroyed".

Even more curious if Iran intends to make peace with Israel; who would, as it has in the past, suspect any Iranian nuclear program as being geared toward the development of weapons for use against Israel.  


This act reads, to me, as Iran saying to the world "You asked for it. Now we're going to give it to you!".  Which, in context would be quite a "ballsey" thing to do....if Iran didn't have at least some way to back up their threat.

Iran has had a long time to plan for this day. The despots who have ruled Iran for decades can be assumed to share, in common with all despots, one trait: paranoia. 

And paranoia, with enough time to fester, breeds "Plans".



ETA: 

Curious that the US forces attacking those three (just three!) facilities in Iran met with NO resistance from defending forces. I understand stealth and diminished opposing resources et al. But really, no resistance?

It was just three sites, three targets...one of which was the Prime target! And Iran couldn't (or wouldn't?) put up even a token fight for it?

Because banks don't have security guards?

[quintessentone]

Isreal took out 90% or more of their air defense network and many air force assets on the ground.

Their capabilities are practically nonexistent plus they would have been no match for the fighter escorts that were accompanying the B-2s.
They didn’t launch any because even if they did detect the incoming strike force, there was basically nothing to launch to attempt to defend anything. 

Just stop and stay in your lane.

My lane is to question everything and find the truth with the help of critical thinkers here on DI.

I would suggest you get out of your cult lane for a change.

[andy06shake]

The goal was to collapse the site, not necessarily destroy the containers. Sites buried under hundreds of tons of rubble are just as destroyed as sites completely blown up.

Then the goal was achieved, but complete obliteration?

Nah, not without breaking/breaching a few steel containers, if the entire facility also went pop in the manner Trump claims.

And if the material was stored there, and the damage was so complete.

You would imagine they would be able to detect at least trace amounts of the 60% enriched Uranium.

Just seems suspect to me, and did you see the big line of Trucks?

I imagine steel shielding can hinder the detection of 60% enriched uranium, depending on the thickness of the steel.   

Obviously, further information is required before coming to any sort of definitive conclusion.

[FlyersFan]

How very "convenient" for Donakd.

And not even a slight detection of radiation.

Not even a peep! 

Miraculous. 

It's to be expected. 
Hundreds of feet of earth and rock on top of whatever nuclear materials may have been there. 
It's not going to be detected.
No 'miracle' about it.

[FlyersFan]

I'm seeing words like destroyed and severely damaged, but not obliteration.

Destroyed and obliteration ... synonymous.

[putnam6]

BINGO
Strikes were known about. planned and even agreed upon by elements in Iran
Damage if largely done was mostly underground where we cant see
Furthermore Iran moved most of their material out beforehand.

I could see them transferring what's already been enriched to 60%

In other, more rational areas of the internet... discussions of Russia securing the uranium to begin the rebuild of all things non-nuclear in Iran, and as a bargaining chip in Ukraine talks 

Remember that flight to Moscow by some Iranian foreign minister, the day after?


https://x.com/i/grok/share/CES4ulrDWFA1JAA0WzLpGhWe8

Whether Russia could assume control of or secure Iran's uranium stockpile is a complex issue involving geopolitical, technical, and diplomatic considerations. As of June 26, 2025, there is no definitive evidence that Russia has taken control of Iran's uranium stockpile, but there are indications of Russian willingness to play a role in managing it as part of diplomatic efforts to curb Iran's nuclear program. Below is an analysis based on available information, including recent developments and the broader context of Russia-Iran relations.
Key Points on Russia’s Potential Role

• Russian Offers to Store Iran’s Uranium:
  • In April and June 2025, Russia expressed readiness to accept and store Iran’s highly enriched uranium (HEU) as part of a potential U.S.-Iran nuclear deal. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov confirmed Moscow’s willingness to provide such services, suggesting Russia could convert Iran’s HEU into civilian reactor fuel to reduce proliferation risks.
    
  • The Guardian reported in April 2025 that Russia was touted as a possible destination for Iran’s uranium stockpile, potentially acting as an arbiter of deal breaches in a new nuclear agreement. This arrangement would involve Russia holding the uranium to ensure Iran’s compliance with limits on enrichment, with the possibility of returning it to Iran if the U.S. were to withdraw from a future deal.
    
  • Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated in April 2025 that Russia would be willing to store Iran’s enriched nuclear material if both the U.S. and Iran deemed it useful, framing it as a diplomatic gesture to facilitate negotiations.
    
• Iran’s Resistance to Transfer:
  • Iran has consistently resisted proposals to transfer its entire stockpile of highly enriched uranium (approximately 408.6 kg at 60% purity as of May 2025) to a third country like Russia. Tehran argues that keeping the stockpile under domestic control, with strict IAEA supervision, is a precaution against potential U.S. withdrawal from a future agreement, as occurred in 2018 under President Trump.
    
  • Iranian negotiators view the stockpile as a strategic asset and leverage in talks, insisting on their “non-negotiable” right to enrich uranium. Transferring it to Russia could leave Iran vulnerable if the deal collapses, as it would need to restart enrichment from scratch.
    
• Russia-Iran Strategic Partnership:
  • Russia and Iran have deepened their strategic partnership, formalized in the January 2025 Iranian-Russian Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. This includes military cooperation, with Iran supplying drones to Russia for use in Ukraine and Russia providing technical support to Iran’s nuclear and missile programs.
    
  • A 2022 intelligence report suggested Iran sought Russian assistance to acquire additional nuclear material to shorten its breakout time to a nuclear weapon. Russia’s historical role in Iran’s nuclear program, such as fueling the Bushehr reactor and providing training, indicates technical capacity to handle Iran’s uranium stockpile.
    
  • However, Russia’s public stance is that it opposes Iran developing nuclear weapons, aligning with its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), while supporting Iran’s right to a civilian nuclear program.
    
• Recent Developments Post-Strikes:
  • U.S. and Israeli airstrikes in June 2025 targeted Iran’s key nuclear facilities (Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan), damaging centrifuge infrastructure but reportedly missing the 408.6 kg of 60% enriched uranium, which Iran claims was moved to an undisclosed location beforehand.
    
  • Satellite imagery showed trucks leaving Fordow and Isfahan days before the strikes, suggesting Iran preemptively relocated its uranium stockpile. IAEA chief Rafael Grossi noted that the 60% enriched uranium, last verified at Isfahan, was likely moved, though its current location remains unconfirmed.
    
  • A post on X claimed that Iran’s 400 kg of enriched uranium was “safely in the custody of Russia” since June 19, 2025, citing a former Argentine official, but this lacks corroboration from credible sources and should be treated as inconclusive. U.S. officials, including Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, have stated there is no intelligence confirming the uranium was moved to Russia or elsewhere.
    
• Technical and Logistical Feasibility:
  • Iran’s 408.6 kg of 60% enriched uranium is stored in reinforced steel containers, transportable by road, rail, or sea, making relocation to Russia logistically feasible. Russia has the infrastructure to handle and store such material, given its status as the world’s largest nuclear power and its experience managing nuclear fuel for Iran’s Bushehr reactor.
    
  • Russia could theoretically convert the 60% enriched uranium into lower-enriched fuel (3–5%) for civilian reactors, as proposed, reducing its weapons potential. However, this would require Iran’s consent and IAEA oversight to ensure compliance with nonproliferation standards.
    
• Geopolitical Implications:
  • Russian Influence: If Russia were to assume control of Iran’s stockpile, it would gain significant leverage over both Iran and the U.S. in nuclear negotiations. An X post suggested Russia could act as an “insurance company,” setting limits on Iran’s nuclear activities, which Iran has reportedly rejected to avoid ceding control.
    
  • U.S. Opposition: The U.S. insists that Iran’s HEU be shipped out of the country or destroyed to prevent weaponization, but it is wary of Russia’s role due to Moscow’s alignment with Iran and its own nuclear ambitions.
    
  • Regional Dynamics: Israel, which views a nuclear-armed Iran as an existential threat, would likely oppose any arrangement that leaves Iran’s stockpile intact, even under Russian control, given Russia’s strategic ties to Iran.
    
  • China and Russia Axis: Russia’s cooperation with Iran is part of a broader axis with China and North Korea, which could complicate Western efforts to secure the stockpile. Both Russia and China voted against an IAEA resolution in June 2025 declaring Iran non-compliant with its nuclear obligations.
    

Could Russia Assume Control or Secure the Stockpile?

• Possibility: Yes, Russia has the technical capability and has expressed willingness to store Iran’s uranium as part of a diplomatic deal. Its existing nuclear infrastructure and history of handling Iran’s nuclear fuel (e.g., Bushehr) make it a viable candidate.
  
• Likelihood: Low to moderate. Iran’s resistance to transferring its stockpile abroad, coupled with the lack of confirmed evidence that the uranium has been moved to Russia, suggests it remains under Iranian control, possibly at a secret location. The X post claiming Russian custody lacks verification and contradicts U.S. intelligence assessments.
  
• Challenges:
  • Iran’s Stance: Iran’s insistence on retaining its stockpile domestically and its distrust of external powers, including Russia, reduce the chances of a transfer.
    
  • IAEA Oversight: Any transfer to Russia would require IAEA monitoring to prevent diversion, which Iran has historically limited since suspending the Additional Protocol in 2021.
    
  • U.S.-Russia Tensions: The U.S. would likely oppose Russia controlling the stockpile without ironclad guarantees, given Russia’s support for Iran’s military and nuclear programs.
    
  • Post-Strike Uncertainty: The June 2025 strikes disrupted Iran’s enrichment infrastructure, but the stockpile’s relocation to an unknown site complicates verification. Russia could only secure it if Iran discloses the location and agrees to a transfer.
    

Counterpoints and Uncertainties

• Unverified Claims: The X post alleging Russia has had Iran’s uranium since June 19, 2025, is not supported by major news outlets or official statements. U.S. officials, including Vice President JD Vance and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, have expressed uncertainty about the stockpile’s whereabouts, undermining claims of Russian custody.
  
• Iran’s Capabilities: Even if Russia secured the stockpile, Iran retains the knowledge and political will to rebuild its nuclear program. Israeli analyst Ronen Solomon noted that without centrifuges, the uranium is “like fuel without a car,” but Iran may have undeclared facilities or centrifuges that could enable future enrichment.
  
• Russian Motives: Russia’s offer to store the uranium may be a diplomatic ploy to gain leverage in U.S.-Iran talks or to strengthen its alliance with Iran. Some X posts suggest Russia could use the stockpile to exert control over Iran’s nuclear activities, which Iran has rejected.
  
• Strategic Risks: Transferring the stockpile to Russia could provoke Israel or the U.S. to demand stricter oversight or even target Russian facilities, escalating tensions. Russia’s alignment with Iran and its own nuclear arsenal make it a controversial custodian.
  

Conclusion
Russia could theoretically assume control of or secure Iran’s uranium stockpile, given its technical expertise and expressed willingness to act as a third-party custodian in nuclear negotiations. However, Iran’s resistance to transferring its 408.6 kg of 60% enriched uranium, its strategic value as a bargaining chip, and the lack of confirmed evidence of a transfer to Russia make this scenario unlikely as of June 2025. The recent U.S. and Israeli strikes and Iran’s reported relocation of the stockpile to an undisclosed location further complicate the situation. Claims on X about Russia already holding the uranium are unverified and contradicted by U.S. intelligence. For Russia to secure the stockpile, Iran would need to agree to a transfer under IAEA oversight, and the U.S. would need to accept Russia’s role, both of which face significant diplomatic hurdles. The stockpile’s current location remains a critical uncertainty, and ongoing IAEA efforts to verify it will shape future developments.

 

The economic value of Iran’s uranium stockpile is hard to quantify due to sanctions and the lack of a legal market, but a rough estimate based on production costs suggests the 408.6 kg of 60% enriched uranium could be worth $10–$20 million to produce, with the total 9,248.7 kg stockpile (including lower-enriched uranium) potentially costing $20–$50 million in raw materials and enrichment. On a hypothetical black market, the 60% enriched portion could fetch $40–$50 million or more due to its weapons potential, but no such market exists for Iran. Strategically, the stockpile’s value is far greater, serving as a key asset in nuclear negotiations and a deterrent, especially given its potential to produce 9–10 bombs if further enriched. The recent U.S. and Israeli strikes and the uncertainty over the stockpile’s location add complexity, but Iran’s ability to preserve this material ensures its geopolitical significance outweighs its monetary worth

[FlyersFan]

Isn't it odd that the U.S. bombers were allowed to do whatever they wanted to do there without Iran sending in their air force, hmm?

Nope.   Israel had softened the targets up for 12 days.
A surprise hit by America and a massively softened target ... no surprise at all by the lack of Iran response.
And they were STEALTH bombers .. don't come up on radar.

[andy06shake]

Destroyed and obliteration ... synonymous.

The words are interchangeably, they aren’t exactly synonymous in a strict sense.

Destroyed generally means something is ruined or made unusable, but parts or remnants can still exist.

Obliterated means completely wiped out, erased, or removed with almost no trace left behind.

So, something can be destroyed but not obliterated.

There might still be debris, evidence, or a partial structure remaining.

Which is exactly what those satalite images indicate.