Jeju Air 737 crash South Korea

[quintessentone]

They need to make the controls 'pilot error proof' some way or at least have it so that the second pilot has some sort of warning/knowledge what the other pilot is trying to do and has the means to intercept the action. Where was the mutual pilot communication?

I once saw on a WWII war movie where aircraft carriers had a netting system to stop planes quickly, maybe that should be an option at 'end of runway' design?

[Zaphod58]

They need to make the controls 'pilot error proof' some way or at least have it so that the second pilot has some sort of warning/knowledge what the other pilot is trying to do and has the means to intercept the action. Where was the mutual pilot communication?

I once saw on a WWII war movie where aircraft carriers had a netting system to stop planes quickly, maybe that should be an option at 'end of runway' design?

Pilot communication doesn’t always stop mistakes. There was a 737 crash off Honolulu where the crew lost an engine on take off, identified which engine was having the problems, and still shut down the good engine. They were communicating the entire time, and verbally called out which engine was bad, which was caught on the CVR. They ended up in the water just off the coast. Communication helps prevent accidents, but even with communication mistakes can still be made.

[quintessentone]

Pilot communication doesn’t always stop mistakes. There was a 737 crash off Honolulu where the crew lost an engine on take off, identified which engine was having the problems, and still shut down the good engine. They were communicating the entire time, and verbally called out which engine was bad, which was caught on the CVR. They ended up in the water just off the coast. Communication helps prevent accidents, but even with communication mistakes can still be made.

What I am pointing to is only one pilot shut down the good engine, not both. So if there was another procedural step where the other pilot needs to be alerted to and approval given, then the wrong switch would not have been pulled.

[Zaphod58]

What I am pointing to is only one pilot shut down the good engine, not both. So if there was another procedural step where the other pilot needs to be alerted to and approval given, then the wrong switch would not have been pulled.

One pilot did NOT shut down the wrong engine. Both pilots are working the checklist and cross checking each other. There are almost no actions taken during something like this where only one pilot is doing something with out checking with the other.

[quintessentone]

One pilot did NOT shut down the wrong engine. Both pilots are working the checklist and cross checking each other. There are almost no actions taken during something like this where only one pilot is doing something with out checking with the other.

I watched a video from a veteran pilot who said that one pilot is totally focused on flying the plane while the other has other duties, such as pulling switches. So, you are right in that they are cross checking each other, but the focus of the one flying is not focused on the actions of the other pilot.

[Zaphod58]

I watched a video from a veteran pilot who said that one pilot is totally focused on flying the plane while the other has other duties, such as pulling switches. So, you are right in that they are cross checking each other, but the focus of the one flying is not focused on the actions of the other pilot.

Under NORMAL conditions. During an emergency both pilots are working the checklist with the pilot monitoring calling out items, and the pilot flying cross checking before anything is done. Nothing is done by one pilot alone.

[quintessentone]

Under NORMAL conditions. During an emergency both pilots are working the checklist with the pilot monitoring calling out items, and the pilot flying cross checking before anything is done. Nothing is done by one pilot alone.

Both pilots cannot pull one switch at the same time, so could it be pilot confusion, panic, misinterpretation of the symptoms, not following the checklist completely, and/or communication breakdown, intentionally or unintentionally, during an emergency?

What I am proposing is that there should be a way where after the pilots lay down the procedures that there be a way for both pilots to be alerted that each step performed is correct as they do the agreed upon steps.

If they are following written in stone procedures, which from what I see from other veteran pilots they do follow written procedures, then a secondary system could be installed where after each step is undertaken that a green light is shown, if the wrong switch is pulled, then a red light is shown. Actually, if a wrong move is taken then a loud warning signal would be more appropriate.

These planes need to be made 'pilot error proof' IMO in any way possible.

[Zaphod58]

Both pilots cannot pull one switch at the same time, so could it be pilot confusion, panic, misinterpretation of the symptoms, not following the checklist completely, and/or communication breakdown, intentionally or unintentionally, during an emergency?

What I am proposing is that there should be a way where after the pilots lay down the procedures that there be a way for both pilots to be alerted that each step performed is correct as they do the agreed upon steps.

If they are following written in stone procedures, which from what I see from other veteran pilots they do follow written procedures, then a secondary system could be installed where after each step is undertaken that a green light is shown, if the wrong switch is pulled, then a red light is shown. Actually, if a wrong move is taken then a loud warning signal would be more appropriate.

These planes need to be made 'pilot error proof' IMO in any way possible.

They aren’t both pulling the same switch at the same time. It’s called “Challenge-Response”. The pilot reading the checklist calls out the checklist item, such as closing the throttle to an engine, and the other pilot verifies that he is closing the throttle that he said he was closing, and not the wrong engine. If both pilots think that the #2 engine is bad, when it’s actually the #1 however, the wrong engine will be shut down.

 And how exactly are you going to make a plane pilot error proof. Please, enlighten me on how that’s going to be done. The only way to do it would be to remove the pilot, because humans make errors. Then what are you going to do when the computer screws up?

[quintessentone]

They aren’t both pulling the same switch at the same time. It’s called “Challenge-Response”. The pilot reading the checklist calls out the checklist item, such as closing the throttle to an engine, and the other pilot verifies that he is closing the throttle that he said he was closing, and not the wrong engine. If both pilots think that the #2 engine is bad, when it’s actually the #1 however, the wrong engine will be shut down.

 And how exactly are you going to make a plane pilot error proof. Please, enlighten me on how that’s going to be done. The only way to do it would be to remove the pilot, because humans make errors. Then what are you going to do when the computer screws up?

That's what I said, they can't both pull the same switch at the same time, so there has to be some oversight of whether or not the pilot pulling the switches is following the checklist properly.

I am sure the genius' at Boeing or wherever else could devise some sort of connection with or without AI to all the controls, so if the pilots decide on procedure 3 for given symptoms, then when they follow the steps to procedure 3, if they pull the wrong switch an alarm will sound.

[Zaphod58]

That's what I said, they can't both pull the same switch at the same time, so there has to be some oversight of whether or not the pilot pulling the switches is following the checklist properly.

I am sure the genius' at Boeing or wherever else could devise some sort of connection with or without AI to all the controls, so if the pilots decide on procedure 3 for given symptoms, then when they follow the steps to procedure 3, if they pull the wrong switch an alarm will sound.

There is oversight! It’s called challenge-response. Both pilots agree before acting. 

Congratulations, you just described this thing called a checklist.