The instructor pilot on the Blackhawk had 1,000 hours, and the pilot being evaluated had 500 hours. Both were familiar with the airspace, and were on night vision goggles for the flight, which may have hampered their ability to identify the PSA flight.
Looking at radar data, I believe the helicopter crew identified AAL3130 as the PSA flight. They were behind them and on a similar approach, inbound to runway 01, while the PSA flight did a circular approach to 33.
TCAS Resolution Alert descents are inhibited below 1450 feet, and Resolution Alerts are inhibited completely below 500 feet, including audible alerts. They would have gotten a Traffic Alert but unless they were looking at the TCAS screen, they wouldn’t have known. At that altitude and position on the approach they would have been looking at the runway, not in the cockpit.
Looking at radar data, I believe the helicopter crew identified AAL3130 as the PSA flight. They were behind them and on a similar approach, inbound to runway 01, while the PSA flight did a circular approach to 33.
TCAS Resolution Alert descents are inhibited below 1450 feet, and Resolution Alerts are inhibited completely below 500 feet, including audible alerts. They would have gotten a Traffic Alert but unless they were looking at the TCAS screen, they wouldn’t have known. At that altitude and position on the approach they would have been looking at the runway, not in the cockpit.
Logic is dead. Long live BS.