It is suspiciously hard to find articles on the other countries that experienced power outages that day/weekend, almost as if they were scrubbed and we are supposed to only focus on Iberia.
But in a bid to perhaps cover up the space weather involved that seems to be the case.
Luckily a blog I read found these, 
 Britain struck by unusual power activity hours before blackouts in Spain and PortugalBritain’s grid operator has confirmed it is investigating unexplained changes in electricity frequency seen early on Sunday morning and also in the evening. The system’s frequency must be kept within specific limits for the lights to remain on.
Control room staff noticed the first incident at around 2am at the Keadby 2 gas-fired power plant in Lincolnshire, as well as the Viking Link interconnector between the UK and Denmark. Then, power plant failures were again seen at around 6pm.
 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/ho...41631.html

You want to go out on a limb, perhaps its not just space weather, its MANMADE MANIPULATED IONOSPHERE AND WEATHER!

https://theconversation.com/did-induced-...non-255497

The space weather could have been the trigger. The real problem is the relience on inverter technology that is unproven to supply large portions of the power when things like this occure. The engineering just is not there yet to go full inverter power.

Spinning generators have a flywheel effect that makes them more stable. Perhaps we need to switch back to dynomotors for the power conversion.

(05-06-2025, 09:12 AM)sahgwa Wrote: It is suspiciously hard to find articles on the other countries that experienced power outages that day/weekend, almost as if they were scrubbed and we are supposed to only focus on Iberia.
But in a bid to perhaps cover up the space weather involved that seems to be the case.
Luckily a blog I read found these, 
 Britain struck by unusual power activity hours before blackouts in Spain and PortugalBritain’s grid operator has confirmed it is investigating unexplained changes in electricity frequency seen early on Sunday morning and also in the evening. The system’s frequency must be kept within specific limits for the lights to remain on.
Control room staff noticed the first incident at around 2am at the Keadby 2 gas-fired power plant in Lincolnshire, as well as the Viking Link interconnector between the UK and Denmark. Then, power plant failures were again seen at around 6pm.
 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/ho...41631.html

You want to go out on a limb, perhaps its not just space weather, its MANMADE MANIPULATED IONOSPHERE AND WEATHER!

https://theconversation.com/did-induced-...non-255497

Trojan horse communication devices in Chinese-made solar power inverters

https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articl...-inverters

Quote:By Sarah McFarlane
LONDON (Reuters) -U.S. energy officials are reassessing the risk posed by Chinese-made devices that play a critical role in renewable energy infrastructure after unexplained communication equipment was found inside some of them, two people familiar with the matter said.
Power inverters, which are predominantly produced in China, are used throughout the world to connect solar panels and wind turbines to electricity grids. They are also found in batteries, heat pumps and electric vehicle chargers.
While inverters are built to allow remote access for updates and maintenance, the utility companies that use them typically install firewalls to prevent direct communication back to China.
However, rogue communication devices not listed in product documents have been found in some Chinese solar power inverters by U.S experts who strip down equipment hooked up to grids to check for security issues, the two people said.
Over the past nine months, undocumented communication devices, including cellular radios, have also been found in some batteries from multiple Chinese suppliers, one of them said.
Reuters was unable to determine how many solar power inverters and batteries they have looked at.
The rogue components provide additional, undocumented communication channels that could allow firewalls to be circumvented remotely, with potentially catastrophic consequences, the two people said.

 
Using the rogue communication devices to skirt firewalls and switch off inverters remotely, or change their settings, could destabilise power grids, damage energy infrastructure, and trigger widespread blackouts, experts said.
"That effectively means there is a built-in way to physically destroy the grid," one of the people said,
The two people declined to name the Chinese manufacturers of the inverters and batteries with extra communication devices, nor say how many they had found in total.

(05-14-2025, 07:12 PM)putnam6 Wrote: Trojan horse communication devices in Chinese-made solar power inverters

https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articl...-inverters

This is a very good angle.
With Chinese backdoors known about for decades, we are suddenly letting the meme out in public to play.
Now it is getting traction, and could very well have been a three pronged event;
Atmospheric/Space weather
Failure of inverters not due to natural weakness alone but Chinese 'playing
Not sufficient power in the grid from traditional sources to stabilise the current

(05-15-2025, 01:34 PM)sahgwa Wrote: This is a very good angle.
With Chinese backdoors known about for decades, we are suddenly letting the meme out in public to play.
Now it is getting traction, and could very well have been a three pronged event;
Atmospheric/Space weather
Failure of inverters not due to natural weakness alone but Chinese 'playing
Not sufficient power in the grid from traditional sources to stabilise the current

3 strikes and NetZero is out


Looking for verification, but this popped up on my feed

The Spectator Index

@spectatorindex

JUST IN: Belgium's parliament votes to abandon the phasing out of nuclear power

https://x.com/jhayflanagan/status/1923117641117663494
 On May 15, 2025, Belgium’s parliament voted to abandon a two-decades-old plan to phase out nuclear power, marking a significant shift in the country’s energy policy. The decision reverses a 2003 law that mandated the closure of all nuclear power plants by 2025 and prohibited new reactor construction, driven by concerns over energy security following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The new policy, led by Prime Minister Bart De Wever’s coalition government, aims to extend the operation of existing reactors, such as Doel 4 and Tihange 3, and supports the development of new nuclear capacity, including small modular reactors, to maintain and potentially double the current 4 gigawatts of nuclear power. However, the plan faces opposition from nuclear operator Engie, which focuses on decommissioning and argues that further extensions beyond 2035 are impractical, setting the stage for potential conflicts.

(05-02-2025, 05:30 PM)sahgwa Wrote: The point remains that all evidence is pointing to a failure of 'green' energy systems implemented for woke points or by decree of EU. 

Thought Professor Daniel Lacalle raised some interesting points here about the dangers of 'ideologues' dictating energy policy and 'yes men' in government.

Apparently lots of warnings were willfully ignored.

The Spanish government has presented the results of the report (but I can't find the report itself), and the main conclusion is that the blackout was the result of several situations, but these are the main key points:
- on the previous day, 10 thermal power plants were scheduled to be available for dynamic voltage control, but one had problems and was declared unavailable, but not replaced, so instead of 10 power plants, on the next day they would have only 9 power plants available for voltage control;
- at 12:03 PM, one power plant (some say it was Iberdrola's Núñez de Balboa plant, in Badajoz) started having big voltage oscillations that are not normal on solar power plants as it was an oscillation in active and reactive power. The oscillation reached around 70% of the voltage that was being produced just before it;
- at 12:19 PM another oscillation appeared, this one from central Europe, so they asked another power plant to become active to compensate the negative effect on voltage the compensation of that central Europe oscillation would cause. The problem as that the power plant would need one hour and a half to become active;
- from 12:32 PM a linear rise in voltage was noticed, so some power plants were disconnected, with some of those needed to protect the power plants while others were not really necessary or done incorrectly.

They say some of the behaviours of the power plants were wrong or badly implemented, and the lack of enough power plants able to control de grid in case of necessity was pointed out in 2021 by the Spanish grid operator, but nothing was done since.

(06-19-2025, 03:58 PM)ArMaP Wrote: The Spanish government has presented the results of the report (but I can't find the report itself), and the main conclusion is that the blackout was the result of several situations, but these are the main key points:
- on the previous day, 10 thermal power plants were scheduled to be available for dynamic voltage control, but one had problems and was declared unavailable, but not replaced, so instead of 10 power plants, on the next day they would have only 9 power plants available for voltage control;
- at 12:03 PM, one power plant (some say it was Iberdrola's Núñez de Balboa plant, in Badajoz) started having big voltage oscillations that are not normal on solar power plants as it was an oscillation in active and reactive power. The oscillation reached around 70% of the voltage that was being produced just before it;
- at 12:19 PM another oscillation appeared, this one from central Europe, so they asked another power plant to become active to compensate the negative effect on voltage the compensation of that central Europe oscillation would cause. The problem as that the power plant would need one hour and a half to become active;
- from 12:32 PM a linear rise in voltage was noticed, so some power plants were disconnected, with some of those needed to protect the power plants while others were not really necessary or done incorrectly.

They say some of the behaviours of the power plants were wrong or badly implemented, and the lack of enough power plants able to control de grid in case of necessity was pointed out in 2021 by the Spanish grid operator, but nothing was done since.

Ice T had a few more questions and wondered what this all meant for NetZero  

 

https://x.com/i/grok/share/Gx5PTrV4vfERUGWSs9HAiM6lE

Quick answer
 The Portugal and Spain blackout was caused by a voltage surge and grid management failures, not an inherent flaw in renewables. However, it exposed the challenges of transitioning to low-inertia, renewable-heavy grids without adequate infrastructure. For Net Zero to succeed, countries must:

• Invest heavily in grid modernization, including synthetic inertia and storage.
  
• Maintain a balanced energy mix with stable backup systems.
  
• Strengthen cross-border grid interconnections.
  
• Combat misinformation to sustain public support for clean energy.
  

Failure to address these issues risks more outages, economic losses, and political resistance to Net Zero. However, with strategic investments, as demonstrated by successful renewable integration in places like Scotland, the transition to clean energy can be both reliable and resilient

Bathroom reader answer
 The massive blackout in Spain and Portugal on April 28, 2025, affected approximately 55-60 million people and was one of the worst in European history. Official investigations have identified the proximate cause, and it has significant implications for the pursuit of Net Zero goals.
Cause of the Blackout
The blackout was triggered by a series of technical failures originating at a substation in Granada, Spain, followed by rapid failures in Badajoz and Seville. This led to a loss of 2.2 gigawatts of power generation within five seconds, causing a cascade of grid disconnections across the Iberian Peninsula. The Spanish government's report, released on June 17, 2025, described the event as a "multifactorial" system failure due to the grid's inability to control a surge in voltage. Specifically:

• Insufficient Thermal Power: Spain’s grid operator, Red Eléctrica (REE), did not have enough thermal power stations (e.g., gas or coal) online to stabilize the grid during peak hours. This lack of "grid inertia" (the stabilizing effect from traditional power plants' rotating turbines) made the system vulnerable to voltage surges.
  
• Renewable Disconnections: At the time, Spain was generating over 50% of its electricity from solar and about 12% from wind. A voltage surge caused renewable power plants (solar and wind) to disconnect automatically as per safety protocols, exacerbating the grid collapse. These disconnections were a consequence, not the cause, of the initial disturbance.
  
• Grid Management Issues: The report highlighted "bad planning" by REE, including a miscalculation in balancing supply and demand. The grid was exporting power to Portugal, France, and Morocco, and operating with low inertia, which amplified the impact of the initial failure.
  
• No Cyberattack or Weather Event: Both a cyberattack and extreme weather (e.g., "induced atmospheric vibration") were ruled out. REE and Portugal’s grid operator, REN, denied early claims of a rare atmospheric event, and Spain’s meteorological office confirmed normal weather conditions.
  

The European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) is conducting a further investigation, with a factual report expected to provide additional details.
Implications for Net Zero
The blackout has sparked debate about the reliability of renewable-heavy grids and the challenges of achieving Net Zero (zero carbon emissions). Key implications include:

• Grid Inertia and Stability Challenges:
  • Renewable energy sources like solar and wind have low inertia compared to traditional gas, coal, or nuclear plants. Inertia helps stabilize grid frequency during sudden disruptions. The blackout exposed vulnerabilities in grids with high renewable penetration (Spain sourced ~80% of its electricity from renewables at the time).
    
  • Lesson: To achieve Net Zero, grids must invest in technologies like grid-forming inverters, synchronous compensators, flywheels, or battery storage systems to provide synthetic inertia and stabilize frequency. The UK’s National Grid, for example, is already implementing such solutions, as seen in Scotland’s 2022 success in meeting 100% of electricity demand with renewables without major outages.
    
• Need for Grid Modernization:
  • The incident underscores the necessity of upgrading aging grid infrastructure to handle the variability of renewables. Spain’s grid, despite being described as one of Europe’s most resilient, struggled with rapid integration of solar and wind without sufficient backup or storage.
    
  • Lesson: Net Zero requires significant investment in grid flexibility, including stronger interconnections (e.g., with France’s stable grid) and large-scale battery storage, like the UK’s Pillswood project. Failure to modernize risks further outages, as seen in Spain’s weak interconnection with the broader European grid.
    
• Misinformation and Political Backlash:
  • Some media outlets and commentators initially blamed renewables and Net Zero policies, with headlines like “Net Zero blamed for blackout chaos” (The Daily Telegraph). However, experts, including Spain’s Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez and REE, clarified that renewables were not the root cause; rather, poor grid management and insufficient thermal backup were at fault.
    
  • Lesson: Public perception of renewables can be damaged by misinformation, slowing Net Zero progress. Transparent communication and independent technical analysis are critical to counter politicized narratives, as emphasized by experts like those at The Conversation.
    
• Balancing Renewables with Backup Systems:
  • The blackout occurred during a period of high solar output and low demand, leading to negative electricity prices, which made nuclear and gas plants economically unviable and prompted their shutdown. This reduced the grid’s ability to absorb disturbances.
    
  • Lesson: Net Zero strategies must include mechanisms to keep stable power sources (e.g., nuclear or gas with carbon capture) or advanced storage online during high renewable output. Policies should incentivize stable generation to complement renewables, rather than relying solely on market dynamics.
    
• Economic and Social Impacts:
  • The blackout caused significant disruption, including stranded passengers, closed businesses, and at least eight deaths (e.g., from generator-related carbon monoxide poisoning or oxygen machine failures). Economic losses were estimated at €2.25-4.5 billion.
    
  • Lesson: Reliable electricity is critical for public safety and economic stability. Net Zero transitions must prioritize resilience to maintain public trust and avoid setbacks in clean energy adoption.
    
• Opportunity for Innovation:
  • The blackout is a “wake-up call” for enhancing grid resilience, as noted by experts like Kathryn Porter. Solutions like rooftop solar with storage can improve local resilience, as highlighted by the Global Solar Council.
    
  • Lesson: Net Zero can drive innovation in grid technologies, creating opportunities for economic growth and energy autonomy, as Spain’s environment minister emphasized.
    

Conclusion
The Portugal and Spain blackout was caused by a voltage surge and grid management failures, not an inherent flaw in renewables. However, it exposed the challenges of transitioning to low-inertia, renewable-heavy grids without adequate infrastructure. For Net Zero to succeed, countries must:

• Invest heavily in grid modernization, including synthetic inertia and storage.
  
• Maintain a balanced energy mix with stable backup systems.
  
• Strengthen cross-border grid interconnections.
  
• Combat misinformation to sustain public support for clean energy.
  

Failure to address these issues risks more outages, economic losses, and political resistance to Net Zero. However, with strategic investments, as demonstrated by successful renewable integration in places like Scotland, the transition to clean energy can be both reliable and resilient

Where did you get that "the blackout was triggered by a series of technical failures originating at a substation in Granada" part from? The report apparently says it was a power plant in Badajoz.

(06-19-2025, 06:46 PM)ArMaP Wrote: Where did you get that "the blackout was triggered by a series of technical failures originating at a substation in Granada" part from? The report apparently says it was a power plant in Badajoz.

https://x.com/i/grok/share/Gx5PTrV4vfERUGWSs9HAiM6lE

 relevant web pages at the link