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B-2 Accident Report
#1
On December 10, 2022 B-2A 90-0041 "Spirit of Hawaii" departed Whiteman AFB as part of a two ship formation, flying as DEATH12. The mission was to be a spare aircraft for another B-2 that was to fly to Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam. To ensure that at least one aircraft arrived, two were launched from Whiteman. Upon reaching the decision point, with the primary aircraft being healthy, DEATH12 was ordered to return to Whiteman. The crew had an uneventful flight until final approach to Whiteman AFB. 

They were cleared for a standard ILS approach, and at about 200 knots the Pilot Monitoring, who was a B-2 Instructor Pilot, lowered the landing gear. The Left Main, and nose gear deployed normally and showed locked, but the Right Main failed to extend. The crew received a primary and secondary hydraulic system caution indicating a hydraulic leak. The B-2 hydraulic system has several parts, including monitoring system, pumps, reservoir, accumulators, and high pressure subsystems. The primary and back up systems normally don't exchange fluid, but when switching between systems some fluid may be exchanged between the two systems. 

The plumbing of the hydraulic systems uses titanium tubing, and CryoFit fittings are used to join two lines together. A CryoFit coupling is a sleeve that goes over both lines, with internal knurling to add tensile strength to the joint. When the CryoFit coupling is prepared to be used, it's dipped in liquid nitrogen, and a tapered mandrel is pulled through the coupling expanding its size.


[Image: CryoFit%20expanded.jpg]


The two lines are passed into the coupling, and it's allowed to return to room temperature.  As it returns to room temperature, the coupling shrinks back to its normal size, and the knurling bites into the lines, creating a fluid tight seal, and creating a "pooch", which resists tension pull out loads.

[Image: CryoFit%20relaxed.jpg]

The B-2 main landing gear consists of the Truck Beam, Shock Strut, Upper and Lower Drag Braces, and the Lock Link Assembly, which consists of the Upper and Lower Lock Links, Lock Link Springs, the MLG Lock Actuator, and Truck Position Actuator. The gear is extended via the landing gear handle, or the Landing Gear Emergency Lowering Switch. The FCCs, PSLUs, and proximity sensors handle the retraction and extension, and are hydraulically actuated. 

[Image: B-2%20MLG.jpg]

The PSLUs issue driver commands to both the Left and Right Main Landing Gear, which have separate drivers independent of each other. Once the gear are down, the MLG Lock Link Assembly rotates to the overcentered position, locking the landing gear in place, and the truck beam rotates the wheels to the toe-down configuration for landing. 

[Image: B-2%20Lock%20Link%20Assembly.jpg]

During emergency extension, accumulated pressure is used to lower the landing gear, the Lock Link is rotated to overcentered, as normal, but the link is held in place by two springs, that apply about 100 pounds each of force on the Lock Link Assembly. On the Mishap Flight, when the landing gear handle was lowered, the hydraulic system pressurized, and all three landing gear doors unlocked and began to cycle, but the Right Main Landing Gear (RMLG) CryoFit coupler failed, separating the two lines and allowing hydraulic fluid to leak, and pressures to drop low enough to trigger the warnings in the cockpit. 

The leak prevented hydraulic fluid from reaching the RMLG sequence valve, keeping the RMLG locked. The door cycled open and closed repeatedly as the system switched between primary and back up systems. The FCCs switched six times, attempting to unlock the right mains, but failed due to lack of hydraulic fluid. The crew almost immediately performed an emergency gear extension, and were able to get three green in the cockpit showing all three landing gear were down and locked. 

The crew landed approximately 1,000 feet down the runway at Whiteman, and the left main failed almost immediately. The aircraft dropped onto the landing gear door, and the landing gear folded into the wheel well. The aircraft began sliding down the runway, with the left wingtip dragging along the runway, and eventually the grass beside the runway. At approximately 8700 feet down the runway, the left wing dragged across a taxiway beside the runway, causing the wingtip to erode until the left wing surge tank began leaking fuel as they continued to slide. The aircraft finally stopped, and a fuel fire caught up to the aircraft and started burning.

The Whiteman fire department arrived on scene and began fighting the fire. They correctly identified it as a fuel fire, originating at the left wing. However, the incident commander ordered the firefighters to begin fighting the fire with water, instead of AFFF, as he believed that Air Force Instructions required the use of AFFF as a last resort when fighting fires. 

Approximately three and a half minutes after they began fighting the fire, the incident commander ordered the use of AFFF, which allowed them to knock the fire down enough to begin to approach the wing to fight the internal fire. As they prepared to start spraying the wing, the surge tank exploded, forcing them back. They were able to knock that fire down, and were approaching the wing again, when the left outboard fuel tank exploded, sending an approximately six foot section of skin into the air, landing near the firefighters. 

[Image: B-2%202022.jpg]

The crew was able to shut the engines down, and attempted to egress through the crew entry door. They were able to open the hatch, but weren't able to extend the ladder due to the aircraft sitting on the left main door.

[Image: B-2%20Left%20Main%20Door.jpg]
They were able to squeeze out the opening and safely egress the aircraft, and were met by medical personnel. 

The investigation found that upon landing, the TPA compresses 1-2 inches, which causes fluid to circulate internally. The fluid is forced out due to different sizes of the actuator. During the compression, a transient hydraulic pulse is created that cycles through the return circuit, and the destow hydraulic line, through the MLG sequence valves, to the Switching Valve, and into the reservoir. It also cycles to the Lock Actuator, causing a slight constriction of the lock springs, which allows the Lock Link Assembly to rotate out of the overcenter position and unlock. This is what caused the failure of the landing gear as soon as the aircraft touched down.  The aircraft was deemed a total loss, as repairs were estimated at $300M for the airframe, and another $27,500 in damages to the airfield.
#2
All that expensive, super-sophisticated machinery dependent on the world's oldest and most mature technology – the wheel – and it lets them down flat. Hubris gets its comeuppance.
#3
I live not far from Whiteman and I remember when that happened, that was quite the situation. 

Hell, you could see the aircraft and cleanup crew on google maps until about 4 or 5 months ago. 

I love living this close and seeing/hearing all of the flyover trainings they do in my area. Plus being a life long KC Chiefs fan and always having them do flyovers for the game never ceases to make the hair on my arm stand up and give me goosebumps. Granted, being a red blooded American, almost any US Military show of force does that to me. Plus I'm a guy so I hear a bird in the air and I am running outside to see what it is.
#4
I was carp fishing a lake when Obama's helicopter came over - he'd visited nearby Stonehenge.

It had two Ospreys with it.  Very low.  Man, they were noisy.

Living next to Salisbury Plain, we sometimes get them flying really low over our house.

They are beasts.  Like the Hercules used to do, they seemed to use our chimneys as a waypoint.
'l'll just check my Giveashitometer....Nope.  Nothing...
#5
While I was never responsible for anywhere nearly as critical as Whiteman, I WAS the officer on the first-due engine at the NE Florida Regional Airport, where among other things, Northrop Grumman slaps together E-2s. 

The fact that the first-due fire officer at a B-2 incident “BELIEVED” that USAF instructions required the use of AFFF as a last resort” for a flipping JP-8 fire just about made me have a minor stroke. THAT AIN’T THE SORT OF THING YOU GUESS OR BELIEVE. You either KNOW, or you get your ass out of that Officer’s seat and go back to sitting backwards so someone who actually knows the job can do it. 

There is no way in Hell that every one of those firefighters isn’t ARFF certified. And God help me, but if that is NOT the case, then whoever was responsible for scheduling that department’s assignment roster has zero business driving a Battalion Chief’s truck. Airports are special assignments. Even if the responding fire apparatus are municipal and not employed contracted by the airport authority, unless they are responding to support dedicated ARFF rigs and personnel, they absolutely must be ARFF certified. Anything less is straight up negligence.

AFFF is the DEFAULT for aircraft fires, 24/7/365 unless you are presented with a very specific warning point that explains why it shouldn’t be and clearly designates the preferred and suggested alternative. 

I’m going to see if I can dig up any of the incident reports or other response data for this one. In the meantime…I’m gonna go try to find my happy place. This has really upset
my tranquility!
#6
(12-21-2025, 09:46 AM)Avicula Wrote: While I was never responsible for anywhere nearly as critical as Whiteman, I WAS the officer on the first-due engine at the NE Florida Regional Airport, where among other things, Northrop Grumman slaps together E-2s. 

The fact that the first-due fire officer at a B-2 incident “BELIEVED” that USAF instructions required the use of AFFF as a last resort” for a flipping JP-8 fire just about made me have a minor stroke. THAT AIN’T THE SORT OF THING YOU GUESS OR BELIEVE. You either KNOW, or you get your ass out of that Officer’s seat and go back to sitting backwards so someone who actually knows the job can do it. 

There is no way in Hell that every one of those firefighters isn’t ARFF certified. And God help me, but if that is NOT the case, then whoever was responsible for scheduling that department’s assignment roster has zero business driving a Battalion Chief’s truck. Airports are special assignments. Even if the responding fire apparatus are municipal and not employed contracted by the airport authority, unless they are responding to support dedicated ARFF rigs and personnel, they absolutely must be ARFF certified. Anything less is straight up negligence.

AFFF is the DEFAULT for aircraft fires, 24/7/365 unless you are presented with a very specific warning point that explains why it shouldn’t be and clearly designates the preferred and suggested alternative. 

I’m going to see if I can dig up any of the incident reports or other response data for this one. In the meantime…I’m gonna go try to find my happy place. This has really upset
my tranquility!

Did you ever see the report for Spirit of Washington on Guam? Not the one that crashed on take off, the other one, that spent 18 months getting enough work done to get back to Palmdale.
#7
I learned a lot about Mechanics and fluid delivery.  I know enough to understand and comprehend what was said in the OP, with the help of the diagrams.  You did a good job of explaining it Zaphod. 

So the backup systems failed too, and you did a good job at explaining that too.  Will they be able to gain enough knowledge to alter the system so it does not happen again?  It is good that nobody died in that incident anyway, but I bet those jets are pretty expensive and it is badly damaged, maybe some parts will be able to be salvaged but it looks in pretty sad shape.



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