10-01-2024, 07:54 PM
The following is my hot take, but any glaring errors or omissions are mine.
The issue with Air defence capabilities is what gets through them and finds their intended targets. Reporting the success rate of the Iron Dome might offer the Israeli public reassurance, but it doesn't provide anything useful from an analytical standpoint.
Consider the United States Navy dealing with the kamikazes for a moment. The kamikaze aircraft and other craft didn't breach American defences, failed to find their targets, and never inflicted any damage. But the kamikazes that scored successful hits sunk or inflicted severe damage on vessels.
Similarly, the Royal Navy's experiences with the Argentinian Air Force during the Falklands War are also a valuable case study for historians and military planners. The Argentinian Air Force's conventional attacks against the Royal Navy and other ships involved in retaking the Falklands didn't change the war's outcome. However, the Royal Navy expeditionary force suffered losses from Argentinian aircraft scoring bomb hits on their vessels.
To stay on topic, I will skip the role of damage control at sea and other matters that come into play.
However, one other point worth briefly making is that the kamikazes sunk more United States Navy vessels than occurred in previous WW2 sea and air battles. Moreover, the United States Navy's submarine campaign, not its capital ships, destroyed Japan's merchant fleet. The loss of irreplaceable shipping partly sealed Japan's strategic doom.
I invite the reader to apply the above historical lessons to Irasel's air defences, the Houthis's targeting of shipping in the Red Sea, and future conflicts. If China converts its manufacturing base from exporting low-quality consumer goods to producing war materials, brace for trouble. The output from China's drone and missile factories would not only provide a massive threat but likely tip the balance of the war in their favour.
The issue with Air defence capabilities is what gets through them and finds their intended targets. Reporting the success rate of the Iron Dome might offer the Israeli public reassurance, but it doesn't provide anything useful from an analytical standpoint.
Consider the United States Navy dealing with the kamikazes for a moment. The kamikaze aircraft and other craft didn't breach American defences, failed to find their targets, and never inflicted any damage. But the kamikazes that scored successful hits sunk or inflicted severe damage on vessels.
Similarly, the Royal Navy's experiences with the Argentinian Air Force during the Falklands War are also a valuable case study for historians and military planners. The Argentinian Air Force's conventional attacks against the Royal Navy and other ships involved in retaking the Falklands didn't change the war's outcome. However, the Royal Navy expeditionary force suffered losses from Argentinian aircraft scoring bomb hits on their vessels.
To stay on topic, I will skip the role of damage control at sea and other matters that come into play.
However, one other point worth briefly making is that the kamikazes sunk more United States Navy vessels than occurred in previous WW2 sea and air battles. Moreover, the United States Navy's submarine campaign, not its capital ships, destroyed Japan's merchant fleet. The loss of irreplaceable shipping partly sealed Japan's strategic doom.
I invite the reader to apply the above historical lessons to Irasel's air defences, the Houthis's targeting of shipping in the Red Sea, and future conflicts. If China converts its manufacturing base from exporting low-quality consumer goods to producing war materials, brace for trouble. The output from China's drone and missile factories would not only provide a massive threat but likely tip the balance of the war in their favour.
