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Time to Speak Up: SPACECOM
#1
What's all this then? Whistleblower alleging a secret control mechanism manipulating intelligence and restricting operational control within Space Force and USSPACECOM systems:



Time to Speak Up: Postured for Operational Surprise

Jim Shell

29 September 2025

There is a security control system within U.S. National Security Space fostering abuse and interfering with critical missions. While there is legitimacy to the security control system, leadership lacks awareness of the extent of the risk being incurred to missions vital to the United States and the resulting abuse and collateral damage. For years I have attempted, via formal channels, to bring light to this issue in a manner with the lowest possible OPSEC footprint. However, it is unfortunately now time to come forward publicly.

Following are my allegations:
  • A security control system is supplanting the direction and authority of the US Space Force and USSPACECOM (high confidence).
  • There is direct and unauthorized interference of the Space Domain Awareness mission in violation of explicit, official policy (high confidence).
  • The system has demonstrated the potential to interfere with USNORTHCOM’s protection of the United States. Those attempting to highlight the critical issue were subject to accusations of being “problematic” and not following protocols. Attempts to bring forward the critical issue to leadership were obstructed (high confidence).
  • Intelligence Community insights into Russian and Chinese on-orbit activities have been hampered by the security system (high confidence).
  • Unpublished security rules are being enforced. Guardians have been indicted and removed from duty, threatened with a court martial, yet not provided an opportunity to provide their perspective. All the while, their chain of command was never informed of the nature of the wrongdoing. This was accompanied by an investigative report with many “factual inaccuracies” (high confidence).
  • Funds have been misappropriated (medium confidence).
  • There is a connection to Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena (UAP) activities (medium confidence).
In 2022, I contacted an Inspector General office to begin a formal investigation process into what I have experienced and learned. An extensive UNCLASSIFIED paper was provided conveying a history of my experiences spanning more than ten years. In November 2024, I had a four-hour interview with an Inspector General (IG) investigative team at the TOP SECRET//SCI level to include numerous SAP and CAP programs. I assembled numerous cleared witnesses ready to share their unique experiences with the IG. (Additional witnesses with valuable information are fearful and not willing to talk.) After more than 8 months, none of the witnesses have been contacted by the IG. Indeed, in the UNCLASSIFIED paper I predicted what would occur and how the investigation would be shut down.

At the heart of the issue is a 2018 policy revising the handling of classified space domain awareness data. This policy was cosigned by the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and USSTRATCOM, and later by none of the witnesses have been contacted by the IGUSSPACECOM upon activation as the combatant command for the space Area of Responsibility (AOR).

The crux of the issue? Neither the NRO nor the combatant commands had the ultimate authority to actually invoke the changes stipulated in the 2018 policy, in spite of the advertised validity and ensuing years-long attempts to implement the most critical changes.

Those well informed are led to believe the heart of the matter lies with the NRO Survivability and Assurance Office (SAO). While there are legitimate security concerns residing within the NRO, the path leading to SAO is a distraction. Those associated with SAO equities become an unwitting cog providing a defense of something for which they are completely unaware.

The discord over the failed policy is well established. Senior USSF officials have attempted to make changes. The former USSF Vice Chief of Space Operations (VCSO) made valiant attempts to invoke change. One such failed attempt culminated in a 27 May 2021 meeting where change was shut down. It’s a small consolation that a 3 star general’s involvement was largely responsible for them not earning a 4th star. The former VCSO made a second attempt to invoke change in 2022. Another failure.

Independent investigations have been sponsored, to include one by the current VCSO. Alas, the O-6 in charge of the investigation was never even cleared to what I will term the “foundational layer” necessary to even gain an understanding of what was occurring, much less be able to arrive at independent conclusions. In 2022, the current USSF Chief of Space Operations (CSO) (in a former position) was instrumental in enabling USSPACECOM to receive a briefing blocked by others illustrating the mission risk to USNORTHCOM.

The impact of the authoritative security control system goes far beyond what may be obvious:
  • Taxpayers: programs are not performing to their advertised capabilities with significant additional costs incurred.
  • Coalition, Allies, and Partners: While seniors publicly lament the U.S. challenges of sharing data, few are aware that public-facing space object catalog sourced from our allies contains information for which highly cleared (TOP SECRET +) personnel at the National Space Defense Center (NSDC) can be handed a security violation, even when that information may be UNCLASSIFIED according to cognizant security classification guides. More disturbing still? Blocking of information known to be available to our potential adversaries.
  • OSD(P), Department of State: Those involved in space policy and representing the U.S. in international fora are left uninformed on US on-orbit activities and events commonly observed by the international community. These include apparent violations in “Norms of Behavior” along with more concerning potential recent treaty violations.
  • Golden Dome: evidence supports that there will likely be interference with the sensing layer.
  • Culture: the security system bears much responsibility for a dysfunctional culture in highly classified national security space arenas.
It is frankly impossible for USSF and USSPACECOM seniors to be conversant on the issue in detail. There are virtually no supporting staff who have the requisite security clearances to engage in the discussion, much less the specialized network access required to communicate.

While there is a legitimate national interest that must be protected, there are inadequate controls and oversight. The ongoing collateral damage is far greater in magnitude than appreciated. The system is out of control.

Space is the ultimate high ground supporting the joint fight. Space domain awareness is, in turn, the foundation enabling space superiority and the heart of all USSPACECOM missions. Unfortunately, this heart is cancerous and continues to resist treatment. It’s ironic that the CSO’s number one priority of “Avoiding Operational Surprise” is at significant risk due to internal US policies for which the USSF and USSPACECOM are powerless to change. It is past time this critical issue is understood and addressed.

For those that may wish me harm, I will remind you of what is contained in the previously referenced UNCLASSIFIED paper. It is in your best interest that nothing happens to me.

It’s probably time to follow through on the recommendation of many that I get a lawyer.

Semper Supra



https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn...461093888/

02 OCT 2025 Update: An important correction - I reference the "current VCSO." This should actually state the "second VCSO" or the VCSO from 2023-2025.
#2
I can safely assert that aside from the primacy of the state to simply claim authority to do whatever the hell they want... and aside from the utter decimation of security under political-appointee leadership... we have the whole "who engineered this administrative garbage pile?" question...

(Hint: DHS)

It was almost as if nobody expected this command to last more than one presidency.

Go figure.
#3
(10-05-2025, 11:28 PM)Maxmars Wrote: I can safely assert that aside from the primacy of the state to simply claim authority to do whatever the hell they want... and aside from the utter decimation of security under political-appointee leadership... we have the whole "who engineered this administrative garbage pile?" question...

(Hint: DHS)

It was almost as if nobody expected this command to last more than one presidency.

Go figure.

Is it a panopticon problem, in that it's too easy to "see things one shouldn't"?

Can the national security apparatus operate without a "hierarchy of secrets"?

Who censors the censors?
#4
Bureaucracy will do to the empire what it's enemies never could. The barbarians never had an army, just straw men.

the devil is probably here "recent treaty violations"
#5
So "Ike" Eisenhower signing the Greada treaty helped the transistor and semiconductor boom. Does the human experiment for the alien terms result in things like spike protein?

Some reports of the grays feeding of human blood through there skin, an intergalactic slave trade and been here long before civilization? As a clearer picture of our place in the tree of life emerges, we made it this far, keep punchin.

With the trend of hybridization that has been going on, getting harder to pick.
#6
Hi, it’s me, DI’s resident Guardian. This is everyday life in the Space Force. Overclassification of space-related data has been a large hurdle that hinders progress and availability. Supposedly the process is being worked to downgrade what has historically been TS data down to Secret.

Space is very privatized so of course the major stakeholders like Lockheed, Raytheon, etc. is going to want to keep a tight grip on what they feel is “theirs”.
#7
(10-17-2025, 12:53 AM)Spectral Entity Wrote: Hi, it’s me, DI’s resident Guardian. This is everyday life in the Space Force. Overclassification of space-related data has been a large hurdle that hinders progress and availability. Supposedly the process is being worked to downgrade what has historically been TS data down to Secret.

Space is very privatized so of course the major stakeholders like Lockheed, Raytheon, etc. is going to want to keep a tight grip on what they feel is “theirs”.

It sounds like rather than restricting sensor data to those with clearance, there are censoring systems in place at ever level that elide data based on unknown criteria. That seems like a vulnerability or complexity that can induce many potential problems. It must be frustrating, for example, to be responsible for repositioning a satellite when the sensors one is relying on may be lying in unknown ways.
#8
Dr. Shell is talking about the bs red tape that gets in the way of meaningful progress. Every branch, the IC, defense companies. A lot of folks have their hands in space and all want their piece of the pie but also for their particular slice to have its own flavor and ingredients.
#9
(10-17-2025, 03:34 PM)Spectral Entity Wrote: Dr. Shell is talking about the bs red tape that gets in the way of meaningful progress. Every branch, the IC, defense companies. A lot of folks have their hands in space and all want their piece of the pie but also for their particular slice to have its own flavor and ingredients.

Is the 2018 directive that's being referred to SPD-3? Or is there anything else in place relates to what he's mentioning? How does that all work, if you can say? Thanks!
#10
Yes it is 

On a related note, here is an article from Breaking Defense reporting on what I mentioned about downclassing info and programs.

Another article, illustrating an example on how it’s implemented.