10-05-2025, 11:15 PM
What's all this then? Whistleblower alleging a secret control mechanism manipulating intelligence and restricting operational control within Space Force and USSPACECOM systems:
There is a security control system within U.S. National Security Space fostering abuse and interfering with critical missions. While there is legitimacy to the security control system, leadership lacks awareness of the extent of the risk being incurred to missions vital to the United States and the resulting abuse and collateral damage. For years I have attempted, via formal channels, to bring light to this issue in a manner with the lowest possible OPSEC footprint. However, it is unfortunately now time to come forward publicly.
Following are my allegations:
At the heart of the issue is a 2018 policy revising the handling of classified space domain awareness data. This policy was cosigned by the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and USSTRATCOM, and later by none of the witnesses have been contacted by the IGUSSPACECOM upon activation as the combatant command for the space Area of Responsibility (AOR).
The crux of the issue? Neither the NRO nor the combatant commands had the ultimate authority to actually invoke the changes stipulated in the 2018 policy, in spite of the advertised validity and ensuing years-long attempts to implement the most critical changes.
Those well informed are led to believe the heart of the matter lies with the NRO Survivability and Assurance Office (SAO). While there are legitimate security concerns residing within the NRO, the path leading to SAO is a distraction. Those associated with SAO equities become an unwitting cog providing a defense of something for which they are completely unaware.
The discord over the failed policy is well established. Senior USSF officials have attempted to make changes. The former USSF Vice Chief of Space Operations (VCSO) made valiant attempts to invoke change. One such failed attempt culminated in a 27 May 2021 meeting where change was shut down. It’s a small consolation that a 3 star general’s involvement was largely responsible for them not earning a 4th star. The former VCSO made a second attempt to invoke change in 2022. Another failure.
Independent investigations have been sponsored, to include one by the current VCSO. Alas, the O-6 in charge of the investigation was never even cleared to what I will term the “foundational layer” necessary to even gain an understanding of what was occurring, much less be able to arrive at independent conclusions. In 2022, the current USSF Chief of Space Operations (CSO) (in a former position) was instrumental in enabling USSPACECOM to receive a briefing blocked by others illustrating the mission risk to USNORTHCOM.
The impact of the authoritative security control system goes far beyond what may be obvious:
While there is a legitimate national interest that must be protected, there are inadequate controls and oversight. The ongoing collateral damage is far greater in magnitude than appreciated. The system is out of control.
Space is the ultimate high ground supporting the joint fight. Space domain awareness is, in turn, the foundation enabling space superiority and the heart of all USSPACECOM missions. Unfortunately, this heart is cancerous and continues to resist treatment. It’s ironic that the CSO’s number one priority of “Avoiding Operational Surprise” is at significant risk due to internal US policies for which the USSF and USSPACECOM are powerless to change. It is past time this critical issue is understood and addressed.
For those that may wish me harm, I will remind you of what is contained in the previously referenced UNCLASSIFIED paper. It is in your best interest that nothing happens to me.
It’s probably time to follow through on the recommendation of many that I get a lawyer.
Semper Supra
https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn...461093888/
02 OCT 2025 Update: An important correction - I reference the "current VCSO." This should actually state the "second VCSO" or the VCSO from 2023-2025.
Time to Speak Up: Postured for Operational Surprise
Jim Shell
29 September 2025
Jim Shell
29 September 2025
There is a security control system within U.S. National Security Space fostering abuse and interfering with critical missions. While there is legitimacy to the security control system, leadership lacks awareness of the extent of the risk being incurred to missions vital to the United States and the resulting abuse and collateral damage. For years I have attempted, via formal channels, to bring light to this issue in a manner with the lowest possible OPSEC footprint. However, it is unfortunately now time to come forward publicly.
Following are my allegations:
- A security control system is supplanting the direction and authority of the US Space Force and USSPACECOM (high confidence).
- There is direct and unauthorized interference of the Space Domain Awareness mission in violation of explicit, official policy (high confidence).
- The system has demonstrated the potential to interfere with USNORTHCOM’s protection of the United States. Those attempting to highlight the critical issue were subject to accusations of being “problematic” and not following protocols. Attempts to bring forward the critical issue to leadership were obstructed (high confidence).
- Intelligence Community insights into Russian and Chinese on-orbit activities have been hampered by the security system (high confidence).
- Unpublished security rules are being enforced. Guardians have been indicted and removed from duty, threatened with a court martial, yet not provided an opportunity to provide their perspective. All the while, their chain of command was never informed of the nature of the wrongdoing. This was accompanied by an investigative report with many “factual inaccuracies” (high confidence).
- Funds have been misappropriated (medium confidence).
- There is a connection to Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena (UAP) activities (medium confidence).
At the heart of the issue is a 2018 policy revising the handling of classified space domain awareness data. This policy was cosigned by the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and USSTRATCOM, and later by none of the witnesses have been contacted by the IGUSSPACECOM upon activation as the combatant command for the space Area of Responsibility (AOR).
The crux of the issue? Neither the NRO nor the combatant commands had the ultimate authority to actually invoke the changes stipulated in the 2018 policy, in spite of the advertised validity and ensuing years-long attempts to implement the most critical changes.
Those well informed are led to believe the heart of the matter lies with the NRO Survivability and Assurance Office (SAO). While there are legitimate security concerns residing within the NRO, the path leading to SAO is a distraction. Those associated with SAO equities become an unwitting cog providing a defense of something for which they are completely unaware.
The discord over the failed policy is well established. Senior USSF officials have attempted to make changes. The former USSF Vice Chief of Space Operations (VCSO) made valiant attempts to invoke change. One such failed attempt culminated in a 27 May 2021 meeting where change was shut down. It’s a small consolation that a 3 star general’s involvement was largely responsible for them not earning a 4th star. The former VCSO made a second attempt to invoke change in 2022. Another failure.
Independent investigations have been sponsored, to include one by the current VCSO. Alas, the O-6 in charge of the investigation was never even cleared to what I will term the “foundational layer” necessary to even gain an understanding of what was occurring, much less be able to arrive at independent conclusions. In 2022, the current USSF Chief of Space Operations (CSO) (in a former position) was instrumental in enabling USSPACECOM to receive a briefing blocked by others illustrating the mission risk to USNORTHCOM.
The impact of the authoritative security control system goes far beyond what may be obvious:
- Taxpayers: programs are not performing to their advertised capabilities with significant additional costs incurred.
- Coalition, Allies, and Partners: While seniors publicly lament the U.S. challenges of sharing data, few are aware that public-facing space object catalog sourced from our allies contains information for which highly cleared (TOP SECRET +) personnel at the National Space Defense Center (NSDC) can be handed a security violation, even when that information may be UNCLASSIFIED according to cognizant security classification guides. More disturbing still? Blocking of information known to be available to our potential adversaries.
- OSD(P), Department of State: Those involved in space policy and representing the U.S. in international fora are left uninformed on US on-orbit activities and events commonly observed by the international community. These include apparent violations in “Norms of Behavior” along with more concerning potential recent treaty violations.
- Golden Dome: evidence supports that there will likely be interference with the sensing layer.
- Culture: the security system bears much responsibility for a dysfunctional culture in highly classified national security space arenas.
While there is a legitimate national interest that must be protected, there are inadequate controls and oversight. The ongoing collateral damage is far greater in magnitude than appreciated. The system is out of control.
Space is the ultimate high ground supporting the joint fight. Space domain awareness is, in turn, the foundation enabling space superiority and the heart of all USSPACECOM missions. Unfortunately, this heart is cancerous and continues to resist treatment. It’s ironic that the CSO’s number one priority of “Avoiding Operational Surprise” is at significant risk due to internal US policies for which the USSF and USSPACECOM are powerless to change. It is past time this critical issue is understood and addressed.
For those that may wish me harm, I will remind you of what is contained in the previously referenced UNCLASSIFIED paper. It is in your best interest that nothing happens to me.
It’s probably time to follow through on the recommendation of many that I get a lawyer.
Semper Supra
https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn...461093888/
02 OCT 2025 Update: An important correction - I reference the "current VCSO." This should actually state the "second VCSO" or the VCSO from 2023-2025.







