11-28-2024, 10:27 PM
At 8:17am on November 28, 1979 Air New Zealand flight 901 lifted off from the runway in Christchurch. The DC-10, registered ZK-NZP was delivered 12 December, 1974 in Long Beach. It was the 182nd DC-10 delivered, and by November 28, 1979 it had flown 20,756 cycles. The aircraft was set to fly from Christchurch, to McMurdo Station in Antarctica, and back to Christchurch without landing, giving passengers a look at the Antarctic continent, and Mt Erebus. It was an 11 hour flight, covering 5400 miles.
Prior to the flight the crew would check weather, air traffic control notices, and any issues with the aircraft. They would then check the programmed flight path provided by the Navigation section of the airline. One pilot would load the programmed path, while the other would check the waypoints looking for any deviations. They had a very specific flight path they were approved to fly that put them down the McMurdo Sound, safely away from any terrain. Unknown to the crew, the night before the Navigation section had made what appeared to be a slight change to the path, that would have moved them 2 miles from the final checkpoint. Unknown to the Navigation section, it actually moved the final point 30 miles to the east. Fourteen months prior, the airline had computerized their flight plan system, and when it was put into the computer, the data entry operator put a 4 instead of a 6, which pushed the flight down McMurdo Sound, with the final waypoint over the Dailey Islands. The crews had flown this route so often, they briefed the final waypoint as The Dailey Islands waypoint. According to airline testimony the flight planners and staff all thought the flight path lay over Mt Erebus, while the flight crews thought it went down McMurdo Sound.
![[Image: Gary-CVR-Map.jpg]](https://denyignorance.com/uploader/images/Gary-CVR-Map.jpg)
The crew reached the Antarctic and made a descending orbit to get closer to land, and allow passengers to see the continent. After the descent, they expected to be over McMurdo Sound, and misidentified landmarks that would have given them a correct position. Experience hiker Peter Mulgrew was the commentator on the flight that day, taking the place of Sir Edmund Hilary, who had acted as guide on previous flights. He was unable to make the flight that day as he had previous commitments, so Mulgrew took his place. The CVR picked up his voice at 12:43:27 saying "There you go. There's some land ahead." At 12:45:36, he was heard saying "Taylor on the right now." He had mistakenly identified Lewis Bay as Taylor Valley, where they expected to be. At 12:46:39, the flight engineer asked where Mt Erebus was, and was told "Left about 4 or 5 miles, about 11 o'clock". Mulgrew then said, "No, no, I really don't know." At 12:48:10 Mulgrew misidentified Ross Island. At 12:48:55 the first sign of concern by the crew was shown, but it was only puzzlement not serious concern. At 12:49:35, the comment "You can see Ross Island" was heard on the recorder, but the voice was unidentified. The crew began to get concerned, and talked about doing a 180, and if they had clear terrain to do it. Shortly afterwards the ground proximity warning system went off. The pilot asked for full power, to attempt to climb, but the CVR stopped as the confirmation of full power was being said. The last sound the recorder picked up before impact was the word "Full....", before the recorder suddenly cut off.
At 12:50 the DC-10 impacted the side of Mt Erebus 1467 feet above ground. The aircraft exploded on impact killing everyone on board. There were 237 passengers and 20 crew on board. Several images and videos survived the impact and were later developed. The most chilling of those appears to have been taken as the aircraft is impacting the mountain. It shows what is believed to be fuel impacting the side of the window.
![[Image: the-final-photos-recovered-from-anz-901-...m3vjc1.png]](https://denyignorance.com/uploader/images/the-final-photos-recovered-from-anz-901-shortly-before-v0-il5i7r7m3vjc1.png)
The investigation showed that the navigation coordinates were input exactly as they were printed on the flight plan, and the navigation system was operating well within limits. Conditions on the continent were conducive to creating a white out around Mt Erebus. This caused the mountain to appear to be a flat surface instead of giving the crew a good idea of what the terrain was ahead of them, and no warning that they were dangerously close to the mountain until the GPWS warning went off six seconds before impact. Ultimately the crash was blamed on the pilots decision to make a VMC (Visual Meteorological Conditions) descent below specified minimum safety height while north of McMurdo. It was also pointed out that even if anyone had survived the initial impact the crew had received no survival training for freezing conditions, and there was no cold weather safety equipment.
Shortly afterwards, Capt Alwyn Gordon Vette decided to launch his own investigation, because he didn't believe that the highly experienced crew could have simply flown into a mountain the way the report said they did. He came up with three independent hypotheses:
1. The destination waypoint was moved 25 miles to the other side of Mt Erebus without the crew being aware of it.
2. The three navigation systems confirmed they were on track based on the computerized flight plan.
3. The visual counterfeit of Lewis Bay for McMurdo Sound, caused by sector whiteout confirmed what the crew expected to see right up until impact.
More controversy would come with the CVR transcript. The Mahon Report included the addition of the words "Bit thick here, eh Bert?" at 0047:55(Z), which implied that the crew was flying into thick fog, or poor visibility and was aware of it. The only person claiming to have heard the words was the Investigator In Charge. None of the specialists heard it, and they reported that whatever was said at that point was too unintelligible to know what was said. It was sent to the Washington laboratory, and they all agreed that the phrase was too garbled to be given a reliable translation. Mahon claimed that when he went to Farnborough, he and a specialist heard the phrase. The specialist was a filtering expert, who operated the equipment in the lab. The specialists at Farnborough included the Chief Inspector of Air Accidents for the UK, and all declined to transcribe the phrase as it appeared in the published form. There were no crew members on board that day named Bert, and photographs recovered from passenger cameras taken on the flight showed that the weather was quite clear before the accident. It's far more likely that the phrase was actually "This is Cape Bird". There were several other questionable insertions and changes in the CVR transcript that added controversy to the investigation.
This website is a long read, with lots of documentation, but is well worth the read as it goes into great detail of the investigation and all the controversy surrounding it.
https://www.erebus.co.nz/Background/The-Story
Prior to the flight the crew would check weather, air traffic control notices, and any issues with the aircraft. They would then check the programmed flight path provided by the Navigation section of the airline. One pilot would load the programmed path, while the other would check the waypoints looking for any deviations. They had a very specific flight path they were approved to fly that put them down the McMurdo Sound, safely away from any terrain. Unknown to the crew, the night before the Navigation section had made what appeared to be a slight change to the path, that would have moved them 2 miles from the final checkpoint. Unknown to the Navigation section, it actually moved the final point 30 miles to the east. Fourteen months prior, the airline had computerized their flight plan system, and when it was put into the computer, the data entry operator put a 4 instead of a 6, which pushed the flight down McMurdo Sound, with the final waypoint over the Dailey Islands. The crews had flown this route so often, they briefed the final waypoint as The Dailey Islands waypoint. According to airline testimony the flight planners and staff all thought the flight path lay over Mt Erebus, while the flight crews thought it went down McMurdo Sound.
The crew reached the Antarctic and made a descending orbit to get closer to land, and allow passengers to see the continent. After the descent, they expected to be over McMurdo Sound, and misidentified landmarks that would have given them a correct position. Experience hiker Peter Mulgrew was the commentator on the flight that day, taking the place of Sir Edmund Hilary, who had acted as guide on previous flights. He was unable to make the flight that day as he had previous commitments, so Mulgrew took his place. The CVR picked up his voice at 12:43:27 saying "There you go. There's some land ahead." At 12:45:36, he was heard saying "Taylor on the right now." He had mistakenly identified Lewis Bay as Taylor Valley, where they expected to be. At 12:46:39, the flight engineer asked where Mt Erebus was, and was told "Left about 4 or 5 miles, about 11 o'clock". Mulgrew then said, "No, no, I really don't know." At 12:48:10 Mulgrew misidentified Ross Island. At 12:48:55 the first sign of concern by the crew was shown, but it was only puzzlement not serious concern. At 12:49:35, the comment "You can see Ross Island" was heard on the recorder, but the voice was unidentified. The crew began to get concerned, and talked about doing a 180, and if they had clear terrain to do it. Shortly afterwards the ground proximity warning system went off. The pilot asked for full power, to attempt to climb, but the CVR stopped as the confirmation of full power was being said. The last sound the recorder picked up before impact was the word "Full....", before the recorder suddenly cut off.
At 12:50 the DC-10 impacted the side of Mt Erebus 1467 feet above ground. The aircraft exploded on impact killing everyone on board. There were 237 passengers and 20 crew on board. Several images and videos survived the impact and were later developed. The most chilling of those appears to have been taken as the aircraft is impacting the mountain. It shows what is believed to be fuel impacting the side of the window.
The investigation showed that the navigation coordinates were input exactly as they were printed on the flight plan, and the navigation system was operating well within limits. Conditions on the continent were conducive to creating a white out around Mt Erebus. This caused the mountain to appear to be a flat surface instead of giving the crew a good idea of what the terrain was ahead of them, and no warning that they were dangerously close to the mountain until the GPWS warning went off six seconds before impact. Ultimately the crash was blamed on the pilots decision to make a VMC (Visual Meteorological Conditions) descent below specified minimum safety height while north of McMurdo. It was also pointed out that even if anyone had survived the initial impact the crew had received no survival training for freezing conditions, and there was no cold weather safety equipment.
Shortly afterwards, Capt Alwyn Gordon Vette decided to launch his own investigation, because he didn't believe that the highly experienced crew could have simply flown into a mountain the way the report said they did. He came up with three independent hypotheses:
1. The destination waypoint was moved 25 miles to the other side of Mt Erebus without the crew being aware of it.
2. The three navigation systems confirmed they were on track based on the computerized flight plan.
3. The visual counterfeit of Lewis Bay for McMurdo Sound, caused by sector whiteout confirmed what the crew expected to see right up until impact.
More controversy would come with the CVR transcript. The Mahon Report included the addition of the words "Bit thick here, eh Bert?" at 0047:55(Z), which implied that the crew was flying into thick fog, or poor visibility and was aware of it. The only person claiming to have heard the words was the Investigator In Charge. None of the specialists heard it, and they reported that whatever was said at that point was too unintelligible to know what was said. It was sent to the Washington laboratory, and they all agreed that the phrase was too garbled to be given a reliable translation. Mahon claimed that when he went to Farnborough, he and a specialist heard the phrase. The specialist was a filtering expert, who operated the equipment in the lab. The specialists at Farnborough included the Chief Inspector of Air Accidents for the UK, and all declined to transcribe the phrase as it appeared in the published form. There were no crew members on board that day named Bert, and photographs recovered from passenger cameras taken on the flight showed that the weather was quite clear before the accident. It's far more likely that the phrase was actually "This is Cape Bird". There were several other questionable insertions and changes in the CVR transcript that added controversy to the investigation.
This website is a long read, with lots of documentation, but is well worth the read as it goes into great detail of the investigation and all the controversy surrounding it.
https://www.erebus.co.nz/Background/The-Story
Logic is dead. Long live BS.
